Basketball and Military Strategy

Red Auerbach once suggested that "Basketball is war." Those few words speak volumes and lead to such inevitable questions as, "How would Napoleon have run the half court offense?" and, "Could Stonewall Jackson have gotten back on defense despite those big feet of his?"

Seriously, there are many lessons basketball strategists can learn from the study of military history.

Sun Tzu was an ancient Chinese general about whose personal story we know little. Yet, due to an unparalleled ability to convey his thoughts into words, he still speaks his bingfa to us from out of the mists of time.

Sun Tzu may have had the Boston Celtics Bob Cousy era fast break in mind when he wrote the following:

"Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend, march swiftly to places where you are not expected. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the enemy's weak points . . ."

"Rapidity is the essence of war; take advantage of the enemy's unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots."

Likewise Sun Tzu, when he wrote the following bingfa on war, just as easily could have been speaking of Red Auerbach's strategic basketball philosophy of fluidity and movement at all times on both offense and defense.

"Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards. So in war, the way to avoid what is strong is to strike what is weak."

"Water shapes its course according to the ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing."

Red's teams were so versatile, so smart, and in such superb physical shape that they could play whatever type of game the situation dictated, whether fast break or half court, power or finesse, offensive or defensive. The key was the ability to improvise, adapt and conquer, as the Marines like to say.

By far the most compelling book ever written on military history is Strategy, by B.H. Liddell Hart. After serving as a tank captain in WWI, Hart wrote many brilliant books about past battles, and, through them he evolved a revolutionary idea of mechanized warfare, using tanks, planes and mobile infantry in coordination, which the Germans seized on and developed into the blitzkrieg.

Hart, even more significantly, worked out a stunning theory which he termed "the strategy of the indirect approach". In the book Strategy, Hart asserts that the indirect approach is nothing less than "a law of life in all spheres: a truth of philosophy."

In the sphere of shooting hoops, Hart's insights hearkened back to Sun Tzu and Napoleon:

"Soldiers universally concede the general truth of Napoleon's much-quoted dictum that in war 'the moral is to the physical as three to one'. The actual arithmetical properties may be worthless, for morale is apt to decline if weapons are inadequate, and the strongest will is of little use if it is inside a dead body. But although the moral and physical factors are inseparable and indivisible, the saying gains its enduring value because it expresses the idea of the predominance of moral factors in all military decisions. On them constantly turns the issue of war and battle."

If Hart's theory of the indirect approach is indeed a universal truth, applicable to all spheres including basketball, it wouldn't be surprising to hear his words echoed by the most eloquent veteran of the NBA wars.

Bill Russell had this to say about the preponderance of the moral over the physical in his brand of battle:

"Physical abilities are relatively equal at the top of professional sports. On the Celtics, we believed that the principal differences between good teams and great ones was mental toughness: how well a team could keep its collective wits under pressure."

"Rarely will you see an athlete who hasn't put on ten or fifteen pounds over a full career, but even rarer are the ones who don't put on the same amount of mental fat. That's the biggest killer of aging champions, because it works on your concentration and mental toughness, which are the margin of victory; it prevents you from using your mind to compensate for your diminishing skills."

When Bill Russell, who knew as much about winning basketball games as Hart knew about winning wars, says that mental toughness is the margin of victory, the conclusion follows that Russell was talking about the identical phenomenon that Hart was pointing to.

Much of the book Strategy is devoted to surveying the ways that military commanders have found over the years to bring about that moral victory. At the end, Hart brings all those factors together into an intricate summary of his theory.

Here is a brief summary, using Hart's words as much as possible. It is an attempt at putting forth the concentrated essence of Hart's theory. Many of the ideas and concepts will be new to most people. The book itself has been described as 'challenging'. Difficult as it may be, the rewards are worth the effort.

According to Hart, one important aim of the strategy of the indirect approach is to dislocate and distract the mind of the enemy commander.

"In studying the physical aspect we must never lose sight of the psychological, and only when both are combined is the strategy truly an indirect approach, calculated to dislocate the opponent's balance.

"The mere action of marching indirectly towards the enemy and on to the rear of his dispositions does not constitute a strategic indirect approach. Strategic art is not so simple. Such an approach may start by being indirect in relation to the enemy's front, but by the very directness of its progress towards his rear may allow him to change his dispositions, so that it soon becomes a direct approach to his new front.

"Because of the risk that the enemy may achieve such a change of front, it is usually necessary for the dislocating move to be preceded by a move, or moves, which can best be defined by the term 'distract' in its literal sense of 'to draw asunder'. The purpose of this 'distraction' is to deprive the enemy of his freedom of action, and it should operate in both the physical and psychological spheres. In the physical, it should cause a distension of his forces or their diversion to unprofitable ends, so that they are too widely distributed, and too committed elsewhere, to have the power of interfering with one's own decisively intended move. In the psychological sphere, the same effect is sought by playing upon the fears of, and by deceiving, the opposing command. 'Stonewall' Jackson aptly expressed this in his strategical motto - 'Mystify, mislead and surprise'. For to mystify and mislead constitutes 'distraction', while surprise is the essential cause of 'dislocation'. It is through the 'distraction' of the commander's mind that the distraction of his forces follows. The loss of his freedom of action is the sequel to the loss of his freedom of conception."

Rather than move directly against an opponent, which "consolidates his balance, physical and psychological", the wiser approach is to swing around the enemy and pursue operations on his flanks and rear. This should follow the line of least resistance. In the psychological sphere, this approach is spoken of as following the line of least expectation.

The line of least resistance and the line of least expectation "are the two faces of the same coin and to appreciate this is to widen our understanding of strategy. For if we merely take what obviously appears the line of least resistance, its obviousness will appeal to the opponent also; and this line may no longer be that of the least resistance."

"How is the strategic dislocation produced? In the physical, or 'logistical', sphere it is the result of a move which (a) upsets the enemy's dispositions and, by compelling a sudden 'change of front', dislocates the distribution and organization of his forces; (b) separates his forces; (c) endangers his supplies; (d) menaces the route or routes by which he could retreat in case of need and re-establish himself in his base or homeland.

"A dislocation may be produced by one of these effects, but is more often the consequence of several."

"In the psychological sphere, dislocation is the result of the impression on the commander's mind of the physical effects which we have listed. The impression is strongly accentuated if his realization of his being at a disadvantage is sudden, and if he feels that he is unable to counter the enemy's move. Psychological dislocation fundamentally springs from this sense of being trapped."

"[The] true aim is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by battle is sure to acheive this."

"The perfection of strategy would be to produce a decision without any serious fighting."

Any strategy depends for success on "a sound calculation and coordination of the end and the means." And, "the end must be proportional to the total means." Each expenditure of some portion of the total means must be taken into account, "whether it be to gain an objective or to fulfill a contributory purpose."

The wise leader will seek to establish "a perfect economy of force". This process of adjusting the means to the end, in the heat of the moment, amidst the confusion and uncertainty of war, constitutes the real art of the commander.

"For in war the chief incalculable is the human will, which manifests itself in resistance, which in turn lies in the province of tactics. Strategy has not to overcome resistance, except from nature. Its purpose is to diminish the possibility of resistance, and it seeks to fulfill this purpose by exploiting the elements of movement and surprise.

"Movement lies in the physical sphere, and depends on a calculation of the conditions of time, topography, and transport capacity."

"Surprise lies in the psychological sphere and depends on a calculation, far more difficult than in the physical sphere, of the manifold conditions, varying in each case, which are likely to affect the will of the opponent.

"Although strategy may aim more at exploiting movement than at exploiting surprise, or conversely, the two elements react on each other. Movement generates surprise, and surprise gives impetus to movement. For a movement which is accelerated or changes its direction inevitably carries with it a degree of surprise, even though it be unconcealed; while surprise smoothes the path of movement by hindering the enemy's countermeasures and counter-movements."

"Adaptability is the law which governs survival in war as in life - war being but a concentrated form of the human struggle against the environment.

"To be practical, any plan must take account of the enemy's power to frustrate it; the best chance of overcoming such obstruction is to have a plan that can be easily varied to fit the circumstances met; to keep such adaptability, while still keeping the initiative, the best way is to operate along a line which offers alternative objectives. For thereby you put your opponent on the horns of a dilemma, which goes far to assure the gaining of at least one objective - whichever is the least guarded - and may enable you to gain one after the other."

"A plan, like a tree, must have branches - if it is to bear fruit. A plan with a single aim is apt to prove a barren pole."

It's as though Hart read "Russell Rules" or Russ read "Strategy." Through much of the readings, I was reminded of Russ' "Invisible Man" rule: the thread of an action may be as effective as the action itself. The threat of a blocked shot may cause psychological displacement in the mind of of the opponent because he has previously been exposed to the physical displacement of his goal.

The similes are indeed profound. As is your train of thought. As we traveled to the New York City party on that train, and I saw you reading that little book of Tao, I never realized the extent of the wheels engaging gears in the seat beside me.

Thanks a lot for this submission. I bet Russ would love to read it.

Sam

Good to see you here Spike.

Still quoating Liddell Hart, huh? I've never read Hart but I have read Sun Tzu. There have been passages in "The Art of War" that reminded me of Russellesque saayings. Specifically, when Russ talks about shot-blocking he emphasizes that it is the preparation for the block that allows it to happen. If one gets the opponent in a position where one has the advantage, the block is a foregone conclusion.

Sun Tzu states that battles are won before they are fought. Russell says that if he gets his opponent in a position where he has the advantage, the shot is blocked before it is taken.

Anyways, Spike, looking forward to talking about somne bingfa's this season.

Take care
Carpecarpium per diem

Spike and Carpe,

Now this is what I've missed!

Sir Liddell Hart and Sun Tzu related to the Celtics. I don't think it's an overstatement to say this can be found in no other place on earth.

I've been jammed all day today, but hope to have some time to read this through properly tomorrow.

You guys are the thinking hoopster's board-members. Amazing.

Regards

I think that Russell once said something like, "You wouldn't want to go against Red Auerbach in a war. Red had enough imagination to find a way to blind side you but not too much to daydream while on the way."